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THE PROBLEM OF ALCIBIADES:
PLATO ON MORAL EDUCATION
AND THE MANY
JOSHUA WILBURN
I will not leave you now, nor ever, unless the Athenian people
make you corrupt and shameful. And that is my greatest fear,
that a love of the people might corrupt you.
(P, Alcibiades I   – [Socrates to Alcibiades])
A’ Frogs succinctly captures Athens’ ambivalence
towards Alcibiades in the waning days of the Peloponnesian War:
‘The city yearns for him, it hates him, it longs to have him back’
(). On the one hand, Alcibiades was the object of much admira-
tion and awe throughout his life: he was handsome and wealthy,
successful in seemingly everything he attempted, and—with
the great Athenian general Pericles as his adoptive guardian—
intimately connected to one of the most renowned political figures
of the fifth century. At the same time, however, Alcibiades’ be-
haviour and aspects of his personality gave rise to suspicion and
resentment: his lifestyle was characterized by the kind of excess
and licentiousness that Athenians associated with tyrants, and he
was known for his arrogance and boundless personal ambition,
which made Athenians fear his political aspirations. Indeed, where
his own interest was at stake, Alcibiades proved wily and unscru-
pulous, even engaging in treachery against his own city for the sake
of self-preservation. In the aftermath of Athens’ defeat at the hands
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of Sparta at the end of the fifth century, many of his fellow citizens
were prepared to blame Alcibiades for their devastating loss.
What I am calling the ‘problem of Alcibiades’ refers to the per-
ceived need, among Socrates’ admirers in the fourth century and
beyond, to address and account for Socrates’ famous association
with, and influence on, this controversial and incendiary figure.
Alcibiades’ notoriety (no doubt in combination with Socrates’ own)
had brought a special attention to the relationship between the two,
and given Alcibiades’ reputation for dissolute and perfidious be-
haviour, their relationship contributed (or at least was taken by
subsequent generations to have contributed) to Socrates’ trial and
execution on the charge of corrupting the youth. In the decades
 Lysias provides an especially strong statement of this sentiment in a speech
against Alcibiades’ son: ‘If anyone among you feels pity for those who lost their lives
in the sea-fight, or is ashamed for those who were enslaved by the enemy, or resents
the destruction of the walls, or hates the Lacedaemonians, or feels anger against the
Thirty, he should hold this man’s father responsible for all these things’ (In Alc. I
). For the diverse and complex range of Athenian attitudes towards Alcibiades see
esp. Thuc. . . –; Plut. Alc. –; –; –; ; Ar. Frogs –; And. In
Alc. –; Dem. In Mid. –; and Xen.Hell. . . –.
 Alcibiades literature was popular among the Socratic schools of the th cent.
In addition to the two Platonic or pseudo-Platonic dialogues entitled Alcibiades, we
know of dialogues entitledAlcibiades by both Euclides and Antisthenes, and we have
substantial fragments from the Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettus. We also know
that Phaedo’s dialogues Simon and Zopyrus both depicted Socrates and Alcibiades
together. Xenophon, finally, addresses the relationship between Socrates and Al-
cibiades at Mem. . . –. For an overview of the early Socratic literature see
C. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form
[Socratic] (Cambridge, ), ch. ; and D. Gribble,Alcibiades and Athens [Alcibi-
ades] (Oxford, ), –. For a recent interpretation of Xenophon’s response
to the problem of Alcibiades see G. Danzig, ‘Alcibiades versus Pericles: Apologetic
Strategies in Xenophon’sMemorabilia’, Greece and Rome,  (), –.
 Xenophon reports that Socrates’ accuser explicitly named Alcibiades as one of
the young men of Athens that Socrates allegedly ‘corrupted’ (Mem. . . ). See
also Liban. Ap. – and Aeschin. In Tim. . Here I should, however, em-
phasize an important point of clarification about my objective, which is that my
arguments are meant to be insulated from controversies about the historical Soc-
rates and the so-called ‘Socratic problem’ as it is discussed in L. Dorion, ‘The Rise
and Fall of the Socratic Problem’, in D. R. Morrison (ed.), The Cambridge Compa-
nion to Socrates (Cambridge, ), –; Kahn, Socratic, –; T. Penner, ‘The
Historical Socrates and Plato’s Early Dialogues: Some Philosophical Questions’, in
J. Annas and C. J. Rowe (eds.), New Perspectives on Plato: Modern and Ancient
(Washington, ), –; G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher
(Ithaca, NY, ), ch. ; and R. Waterfield, ‘The Quest for the Historical Socra-
tes’ [‘Quest’], in J. Bussanich and N. D. Smith (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion
to Socrates [Companion] (London, ), –. In particular, nothing in my argu-
ments depends on the idea that Socrates’ relationship with Alcibiades in fact played
a role in Socrates’ conviction on the charge of corrupting the youth. All that mat-
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and centuries following the death of Socrates, therefore, those who
wished to defend Socrates and rehabilitate his philosophical mis-
sion were forced to confront the issue of his influence on Alcibi-
ades. The relationship between the two had represented a conspi-
cuous failure of Socrates’ supposed project of moral reform and one
which—especially in the light of Alcibiades’ great promise—needed
to be accounted for.
In this paper I will examine Plato’s response to the problem of
Alcibiades, and in doing so I seek to defend two main claims. First,
I will argue in Section  that Plato’s diagnosis of the problem—
his explanation of why Socrates failed to convert Alcibiades to the
life of philosophy—consists in two central points: that motivations
associated with the spirited part of the soul play a decisive role
in moral education, particularly in the case of exceptionally ambi-
tious and talented individuals; and that the democratic many them-
selves, not Socrates, are primarily responsible for the corruption of
promising young men such as Alcibiades. These points are con-
nected, moreover: the many exert a moral influence on the young
by shaping and exploiting their spirited motivations. I aim to show
that Plato develops and dramatizes this diagnosis of the problem
ters in the present context is that in the th cent. and beyond there was a perceived
need to address Socrates’ influence on Alcibiades, however historical or merely le-
gendary it may have been, and that Plato felt this need and entered into the debate.
Strictly speaking, it is not even necessary for my purposes that Socrates and Alcibi-
ades ever had any sort of relationship at all. My arguments are, therefore, compa-
tible even with the extreme view, defended by T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith,
Plato’s Socrates [Socrates] (Oxford, ), –, and The Trial and Execution of
Socrates: Sources and Controversies (Oxford, ), –, that politics played no role
in Socrates’ actual trial, and that any apparent evidence to the contrary is due to the
influence of Polycrates, whomanufactured political charges—including Socrates’ as-
sociation with Alcibiades—in his Accusation of Socrates, which was published a few
years after Socrates’ death, and to which later th-cent. writers such as Xenophon
and Libanius were responding (see also A.-H. Chroust, Socrates, Man and Myth:
The Two Socratic Apologies of Xenophon (Notre Dame, )). My arguments are
certainly congenial, however, to interpretations of Socrates’ trial that attribute poli-
tical motivations to Socrates’ accusers, or that at least acknowledge a role for such
motivations. See e.g. R. S. Bluck, Plato’s Meno [Meno] (Cambridge, ), ;
C. C. W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras [Protagoras] (Oxford, ), ; and G. Vlastos,
Socratic Studies [Socratic] (Cambridge, ), –; and recent accounts in R. Wa-
terfield, Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (Toronto, ), –; and M.
Ralkowski, ‘The Politics of Impiety: Why was Socrates Prosecuted by the Athenian
Democracy?’, in Bussanich and Smith (eds.), Companion, –. For discussion of
Polycrates’ alleged influence on Plato see Bluck, Meno, ; E. R. Dodds, Plato:
Gorgias [Gorgias] (Oxford, ), –; Waterfield, ‘Quest’, –; and especially
Gribble, Alcibiades, –.
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of Alcibiades in three earlier dialogues—Protagoras, Gorgias, and
Symposium—as well as in book  of the Republic.
My second main claim will be that the psychological and edu-
cational theories of the Republic are informed by Plato’s diagnosis
of the problem of Alcibiades, and that they are conceived, at least
in part, as a solution to that problem. In particular, I will argue in
Section  that the Republic’s emphasis on the role of the spirited
part of the soul in early moral education, and on the importance of
instilling correct values on a large scale in the ideal city, partly re-
flects Plato’s thinking about Alcibiades and his desire to ensure that
gifted individuals like him are not corrupted by the many. On this
view, the account of education in the Republic is designed to solve
the very problems that, from Plato’s point of view, led to Alcibi-
ades’ downfall as it is portrayed in the earlier dialogues.
. Alcibiades and spirited motivation
Here it will be useful to establish two premisses on which the argu-
ments of this paper will be relying. The first is that the spirited part
of the soul, as Plato presents it in the Republic and other dialogues,
 Although Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium are standardly taken to pre-date
theRepublic, the chronology is unimportant to me, andmy arguments take no stance
on the question of developmentalism in Plato’s works. I will argue that in the Re-
public we find, fully worked out, ideas that are merely sketched or implied in the
earlier dialogues, but I take that to be compatible both with developmentalist and
with more unitarian lines of interpretation. A related point is that nothing in my
arguments will require me to take a stand on the issue of precisely what it means
for something to be a ‘part’ of the soul according to the theory of tripartition as we
find it in the Republic and later dialogues: the continuity in Plato’s thinking that I
will defend should be consistent with a wide range of interpretations of the details
of tripartite theory. For discussion of psychic parthood in Plato and related issues
see C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics [Utopia] (Ox-
ford, ), –; H. Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and
Aristotle (Oxford, ); J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’, Archiv
für Geschichte der Philosophie,  (), –; A. W. Price, ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts
Psychological Subjects?’, Ancient Philosophy,  (), –; C. Shields, ‘Simple
Souls’, in E. Wagner (ed.), Essays on Plato’s Psychology (Lanham, Md., ), –
; and especially the contributions to R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittain (eds.),
Plato and the Divided Self [Divided Self] (Cambridge, ).
 Another obvious dialogue to consider in this context is the First Alcibiades. Al-
though I will not focus on it in the present paper, I will make use of it throughout,
as I take it to corroborate my reading of the other dialogues, as well as my inter-
pretation of Plato’s views on Alcibiades more generally. On authorship of the First
Alcibiades see n.  below.
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is associated with a range of honour- and esteem-related desires,
emotions, and attitudes that include the following: the desires for
honour, victory, fame, and good reputation; anger in response to
perceived slights and injustices; gentleness towards what is fami-
liar and hostility towards what is unfamiliar; feelings of admiration
(towards the kalon) and moral disgust (towards the aischron); sen-
sitivity to praise and blame; the emotion of shame; and the bold-
ness and endurance associated with courage and fighting. Nothing
in this characterization of spirited desire and emotion is new, and
I will defer to existing secondary literature for relevant discussion
and defence.
The second premiss is that Plato takes spirited motivations to
play an especially prominent role in the psychology of Alcibiades in
particular—a view that is, in fact, widely accepted and attested by
other Platonic sources and by the ancient tradition more generally.
We will see evidence of Plato’s view in each of the dialogues ex-
amined in Section , but some preliminary support for it—and per-
haps the most vivid expression of it in the Platonic corpus—can be
 See esp. T. Brennan, ‘TheNature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Object’,
in Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided Self , –; D. Cairns, Aidōs:
The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature [Aidōs]
(Oxford, ), –; J. M. Cooper, ‘Plato’s Theory of HumanMotivation’, in id.,
Reason and Emotion: Essays onAncientMoral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Prince-
ton, ), –; A. Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Im-
personal Good [Hero] (Cambridge, ), ch. ; R. Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’,
Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at –; and G. R. Lear, ‘Plato on Learn-
ing to Love Beauty’ [‘Beauty’], in G. Santos (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s
Republic (Malden, Mass., ), –.
 Indeed, arguably the most notorious feature of Alcibiades’ character, as far as his
contemporaries and successors were concerned, was his ambition. () Thucydides
reports that Alcibiades was an enthusiastic (προθυμότατα) advocate of the Sicilian ex-
pedition in large part because he hoped to advance his reputation (δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν),
and he reports that the public suspected him of aspiring to tyranny (ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπι-
θυμοῦντι) (. . –). () Isocrates writes: καίτοι πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν [i.e.
Alcibiades] δυσκόλως εἶχον ὡς πρὸς τυραννεῖν ἐπιβουλεύοντα (De bigis ). () Xeno-
phon claims that Alcibiades and Critias were ‘by nature the most honour-loving of
all Athenians’ (φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων) and wanted to become the most
famous men of all (πάντων ὀναμαστοτάτω γενέσθαι) (Mem. . . ; cf . . . ; .
. ; . . ). () Plutarch refers frequently to Alcibiades’ φιλοτιμία and φιλοδοξία
(see Alc. . ; . ; . ; . ; and . ) and attributes his rivalry with Nicias to
his distress at seeing the latter greatly honoured by their fellow citizens (Alc. . –
). () In his commentary on theAlcibiades Proclus calls Alcibiades ‘honour-loving’
(φιλότιμον, . ), ‘rule-loving’ (φίλαρχον, . ), and ‘a lover of power’ (δυνάμεως
ἐραστής), and he provides an extended analysis of Alcibiades’ distinctively ambitious
psychology (e.g. at – and –). () Olympiodorus’ commentary on the Al-
cibiades also repeatedly characterizes Alcibiades as a lover of honour (φιλότιμος, . ;
. ; . ; . ) and as a lover of conflict (φιλόνεικος, . ).
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found in theFirst Alcibiades, where Plato (or a Platonic author) has
Socrates testify to Alcibiades’ inexhaustible ambition:
Suppose one of the gods asked you, ‘Alcibiades, would you rather live with
what you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t
permitted to acquire anything greater?’ I think you’d choose to die. What
then is your real ambition in life? I’ll tell you. You think that as soon as you
present yourself before the Athenian people—as indeed you expect to in a
very few days—by presenting yourself you’ll show them that you deserve
to be honoured more than Pericles or anyone else who ever was. Having
shown that, you’ll be the most influential man in the city, and if you’re the
greatest here, you’ll be the greatest in the rest of Greece, and not only in
Greece, but among the foreigners who live on the same continent as we do.
And if that same god were then to tell you that you should have absolute
power in Europe, but that you weren’t permitted to cross over into Asia
or get mixed up with affairs over there, I think you’d rather not live with
only that to look forward to; you want your reputation and your influence
to saturate all mankind, so to speak. ( –)
Here Socrates characterizes Alcibiades’ desire for power, reputa-
tion, and honour as the driving motivation of his young life. As we
will see in Section , Plato takes spirited motivations of this sort to
play a crucial role in Alcibiades’ downfall.
. Diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades
In this section I will argue that in three early dialogues that pro-
minently feature or refer to Alcibiades, as well as in Republic ,
Plato adumbrates and presents his diagnosis of the problem: that
the democraticmany themselves are responsible for Alcibiades’ cor-
ruption, and that they influence youngmen like him by shaping and
affecting their spirited motivations. Although the arguments will
vary somewhat for each dialogue, they will all take roughly the fol-
lowing form. () Plato draws attention to the figure of Alcibiades,
and to spirited elements of his psychology, in contexts that con-
spicuously allude to Socrates’ conviction on the charge of corrupt-
 My arguments assume nothing about the Platonic authenticity of the First Al-
cibiades. For recent discussion of that issue see M. Johnson and H. Tarrant (eds.),
Alcibiades and the Socratic Lover-Educator [Alcibiades] (London, ) (especially
the contributions by Y. Kurihara and E. Benitez, and the appendices by E. Baynam
and H. Tarrant and by T. Roberts and H. Tarrant); and N. Smith, ‘Did Plato Write
the Alcibiades I?’, Apeiron,  (), –.
The Problem of Alcibiades 
ing the youth. () In those same contexts, Plato also draws attention
to the role of spirited motivation in moral education, and to ways in
which the democratic many corrupt, or at least have the potential to
corrupt, the young—especially the most promising among them—
by influencing such motivations. () We can conclude that () and
() are connected: Plato’s attention to Alcibiades and the charge of
corrupting the youth alongside insinuations or accusations that the
many corrupt the young is partly intended as a response to the prob-
lem of Alcibiades.
.. Protagoras
Although Alcibiades is not one of the main speakers of the
Protagoras, his presence is clearly important to Plato: the opening
lines of the dialogue draw immediate attention to him. ‘Where
have you just come from, Socrates?’ an anonymous friend asks.
‘No, don’t tell me. It’s pretty obvious that you’ve been hunting
the ripe and ready Alcibiades’ (  –). Plato also reminds the
reader of the young man’s presence at several key points through-
out the dialogue, and, significantly for present purposes, in the
course of doing so he characterizes Alcibiades as an exemplar of
spirited desires and tendencies. On three separate occasions in
the text Alcibiades rallies to Socrates’ side in order to pressure
 In a recent article R. Ramsey, ‘Plato’s Oblique Response to Issues of Socrates’
Influence on Alcibiades: An Examination of the Protagoras and the Gorgias’ [‘Re-
sponse’], in Johnson and Tarrant (eds.), Alcibiades, –, adopts an approach that
is in some ways methodologically similar to my own: he examines Plato’s treatment
of Alcibiades in the Protagoras and Gorgias in relation to those dialogues’ positions
on moral education, and he draws conclusions on that basis about Plato’s response
to (what I am calling) the problem of Alcibiades. Ramsey, however, arrives at con-
clusions that are quite different from (and ultimately incompatible with) my own.
In particular, he argues that the explanation of Alcibiades’ downfall offered in those
texts is that (a) Alcibiades was corrupted by sophists, and (b) Alcibiades was by nature
corrupt and thus incapable of benefiting from Socratic education anyway. I do not
think either of these explanations can be correct, however: (a) is ruled out by the
fact that in Republic  Socrates calls the many ‘the greatest sophists’ and denies that
any of the so-called sophists teach anything other than the views of the masses; and
(b) is ruled out if, as many commentators have assumed (and I will argue), Repub-
lic ’s discussion of how those with the ‘best natures’ become corrupted is meant
to allude to Alcibiades. Moreover, Ramsey’s explanation evidently ignores the testi-
mony offered by Alcibiades himself in the Symposium, as well as the First Alcibiades.
Because of our different conclusions, Ramsey and I also emphasize very different
elements of the Protagoras andGorgias. For another commentator who discusses the
significance of Alcibiades’ presence in the Protagoras see P. Coby, Socrates and the
Sophistic Enlightenment: ACommentary on Plato’s Protagoras [Protagoras] (London,
), –.
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Protagoras into continuing the conversation ( –,  , and
 –), and crucially, he does so by exploiting Protagoras’ sense
of honour. He suggests that walking away from the discussion
would constitute Protagoras’ admission of his inferiority to Socra-
tes, and the ultimate effect of Alcibiades’ taunts is that Protagoras
becomes ‘ashamed’ (αἰσχυνθείς,   ). Most notably, after one
such intervention Critias comments that ‘Alcibiades is always a
lover of victory in any challenge he rushes into’ (Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ
ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσῃ,   –). His remark attri-
butes a characteristically spirited motivation to Alcibiades—one
that Critias evidently considers a perennial feature of Alcibiades’
character—while also indicating Alcibiades’ impetuosity, a further
trait often associated with spirited psychology.
Alcibiades’ presence is made even more significant by Socrates’
arguments against the teachability of virtue, which subtly allude
to the charge of corrupting the youth. When Protagoras promises
to make the young Hippocrates a better man and good citizen—
which he later identifies with making someone admirable and vir-
tuous ( –)—Socrates confesses that he has never believed vir-
tue to be teachable at all ( – ). First of all, he observes,
there are no recognized or distinguished experts among his fellow
Greeks in the art of citizenship, as there are in other teachable fields
such as shipbuilding. Rather, everyone is considered equally eli-
gible to provide counsel about matters of justice and city manage-
ment ( –). Second, Socrates points out, the men reputed to be
wisest and most virtuous regularly neglect to teach virtue, not only
to their fellow citizens, but even to their own sons. If virtue were
teachable, however, then those who are virtuous would invariably
seek to impart their wisdom to their offspring and others ( –
 ).
Socrates’ speech is directly relevant to the problem of Alcibiades.
Note, to begin with, that Socrates’ sceptical remarks imply a criti-
cism of some of the fundamental principles of Athenian democracy,
which rests on the idea that all citizens are experts in matters of
justice and are fit to share in ruling the city, and which takes the
practices and institutions of democracy to be effective in educat-
 See, for example, Plato’s discussion of impetuous crimes committed out of spir-
ited anger at Laws  –  (and cf. Arist.NE a–b). For Alcibiades’ spir-
itedness in the dialogue see Coby, Protagoras, – and . For Alcibiades’ spirited
nature in general see F. Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire [Desire]
(Oxford, ),  and n. .
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ing its young men. Democratic citizens, it is presumed, collectively
teach one another through their laws and social interactions, and
virtuous fathers, in particular, impart virtue to their sons. The
critique of democracy implied by Socrates’ speech, moreover, evi-
dently reflects doubts about, and perhaps even hostility towards,
Athenian role models and educational practices that were (rightly
or wrongly) attributed to the historical Socrates himself, and which
were strongly associated with his corruption of young men. In the
Gorgias, for instance, Socrates argues at length for the controversial
view that the most renowned politicians of Athens’ past—including
Themistocles and Pericles—actually made Athenians worse as a re-
sult of their leadership ( – ), and Xenophon explicitly at-
tributes to Socrates’ accuser the claim that he taught sons to treat
their fathers and associates with contempt (Mem. . . –).
 The former view is on display in both Apology andMeno, where the democra-
tic partisans Meletus and Anytus, respectively, assert that all Athenians are qualified
teachers of virtue (Ap.  – ;Meno  – ). Trust in a good father’s ability to
educate his sons is evident, among other places, in Isocrates’On the Team of Horses,
where Alcibiades’ son argues, in defence of Alcibiades himself, ‘My father was left
an orphan . . . and became the ward of Pericles, whom all would acknowledge to have
been the most moderate, most just, and wisest of the citizens. Indeed, I count this
also among his admirable qualities—that . . . he was fostered, raised, and educated
under the guardianship of a man of such character’ (). Similar views are found at
Crito  –, Lach.  –, and (with tongue in cheek)Menex.  – .
 Elsewhere in Plato, for instance, Socrates undermines the idea that all Atheni-
ans could be teachers of virtue (Ap.  –) or that the many could ever impart
wisdom (Crito  ). Again, the question of the historical Socrates’ actual political
proclivities—discussed in M. Anderson, ‘Socrates as Hoplite’, Ancient Philosophy,
 (), –; Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates, –; and Vlastos, Socratic,
ch. —is irrelevant to my arguments.
 As commentators have noted, Socrates actually criticizes both sides of the
Athenian political spectrum in the Gorgias by including Cimon and Miltiades
among those responsible for Athens’ troubles. See Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates,
; and Dodds, Gorgias,  and n. , , and . Socrates’ criticism was per-
ceived even in antiquity to be problematic (see esp. Ael. Ar. Pro quattuor –). As
A. Nehamas, ‘Socratic Intellectualism’, in id., Virtues of Authenticity (Princeton,
), – at , comments: ‘Socrates claims that Pericles failed to make the
Athenians good since they eventually prosecuted him and almost sentenced him to
death. But does this argument not apply even more directly to Socrates himself?’
Cf. Dodds, Gorgias, –.
 Although Xenophon defends and reinterprets the Socratic ideas that led to this
reputation, even he acknowledges, ‘I know that he did in fact use this language about
father, relatives, and friends’ (Mem. . . ). Here is a sample of additional evi-
dence that Socrates was associated with anti-Athenian or -democratic views. () At
Meno  –  Socrates provides another argument to the effect that the great lead-
ers of Athens’ past have characteristically failed to improve their own sons ( –
 ). () In the pseudo-Platonic Theages the young Theages tells Socrates, ‘I’ve
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The pertinence of Socrates’ subtly anti-democratic arguments to
the problem of Alcibiades is amplified, moreover, by their inclu-
sion of a crucial reference to Alcibiades himself. In the course of
presenting his case against the teachability of virtue, Socrates points
out the young man’s own reputation for corrupt behaviour:
Take a good look at Cleinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here.When
Pericles became his guardian, he was afraid that he would be corrupted, no
less, by Alcibiades. So he separated them and placed Cleinias in Ariphron’s
house and tried to educate him there. Six months later he gave him back to
Alcibiades because he couldn’t do anything with him. (Prot.   – )
By having Socrates draw attention to Alcibiades’ infamous charac-
ter during a discussion of moral education, Plato calls to mind Soc-
rates’ relationship with Alcibiades and to the role it was perceived
to have played in Socrates’ trial. This association is intensified by
the fact that Socrates uses Alcibiades as evidence that putatively
virtuous fathers regularly fail to educate their sons. By pointing
to Pericles’ inability to educate either Cleinias or, by implication,
Alcibiades himself, Socrates challenges the pedagogical credentials
of one of the pre-eminent champions of democratic ideals. In other
words, Socrates mentions Alcibiades in the course of presenting ex-
actly the sort of anti-democratic argument for which he was known,
and the sort which contributed to his reputation for corrupting
the young and alienating them from their fathers and relatives.
The fact that insolence towards prominent politicians, and towards
Pericles in particular, was one of the well-known examples of
heard about the arguments they say you offer, that the sons of the politicians are no
better than the sons of shoemakers’ (  –). () In the Clouds the effect of Soc-
rates’ ‘education’ of Pheidippides is that he strikes his own father and justifies his
behaviour with a series of casuistic arguments (–). Significantly, perhaps,
Pheidippides (likeAlcibiades) has a family connection to Pericles (seeM.Nussbaum,
‘Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom’ [‘Aristophanes’], Yale
Classical Studies,  (), – at ; andK. J. Dover,Aristophanes:Clouds (Ox-
ford, ),  and xxv–xxvii). For discussion of Socratic education in the Clouds,
and of how the Clouds relates to the Protagoras, see Nussbaum, ‘Aristophanes’, esp.
–.
 Indeed, it is just such an argument that Callicles in the Gorgias associates with
those who have ‘cauliflower ears’, referring to oligarchic young men (cf. Dodds,
Gorgias, ). The inflammatory undertones of Socrates’ remarks are highlighted
even further by his praise of Sparta later in the Protagoras ( – ; and cf. Alc.
II  – ). For Pericles’ failure to educate even his own sons see Plut. Per.
. –.
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Alcibiades’ objectionable behaviour only reinforces this point.
We can conclude, then, that Socrates’ mention of Alcibiades at this
critical point in his discussion of moral education is a deliberate
Platonic allusion to the controversy surrounding Socrates’ reputed
influence on Alcibiades and other young men like him.
If Socrates’ speech alerts the reader to the issue of Socrates’ al-
leged corruption of young men like Alcibiades, Protagoras’ Great
Speech hints at an alternative explanation of that corruption. In
response to Socrates’ case against the teachability of virtue, Pro-
tagoras argues, to begin with, that all human beings are granted a
share in shame and justice, without which political life would be
impossible. The reason all Athenians are accepted as counsellors
on matters of justice, then, is not that none of them is an expert
in the art of citizenship, but rather that all of them are, at least to
some extent. Protagoras furthermore argues that in fact good men
do educate their sons, and he proceeds to offer an outline of how
fathers and citizens in general, along with the democracy and its
laws themselves, teach virtue to young men.
Two features of Protagoras’ defence of Athenian moral education
are especially relevant in the present context. The first is that moral
education takes place largely on a public level through the influ-
ence of the democratic many and the city as a whole: all citizens,
according to the sophist’s picture, have a share in educating the
young. Second, early education and ethical development, as Pro-
tagoras characterizes them, include a substantial role for charac-
teristically spirited motivations. Protagoras identifies justice and a
sense of shame as the necessary conditions of human communities,
and he stresses the importance of teaching children which kinds of
speech and action are admirable (kalon) and shameful (aischron),
just and unjust. He also emphasizes exposure to the praise of noble
 Xenophon famously recounts a conversation in which the young Alcibiades,
after associating with Socrates, arrogantly presumes to best Pericles in argument
(. . –); Aelius Aristides, drawing on Aeschines of Sphettus, reports, ‘Plato’s
speeches [in the Alcibiades I] were directed against a man who not only readily des-
pised Pericles, but as Aeschines says about him, was the sort who “would have most
gladly rebuked the twelve gods”. So great was his excess of pride’ (Pro quattuor
). In the Symposium Alcibiades twice compares Pericles unfavourably with Soc-
rates ( ;  –), and in theAlcibiades I Socrates attempts to woo Alcibiades by
telling him, ‘I hope to exert great influence over you by showing you that I’m worth
the world to you and that nobody is capable of providing you with the influence you
crave, neither your guardian nor your relatives, nor anybody else except me’ ( 
–). Finally, in the Alcibiades II Socrates ominously imagines a scenario in which
Alcibiades might undertake to kill Pericles ( – ).
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rolemodels whom the youngwill strive to emulate, and he describes
how young men engage in gymnastic training that is designed to
prevent cowardice. While the Protagoras shows no interest in offer-
ing an explicit division of the soul of the sort we find in Republic ,
it is clear that the pedagogical and social policies Protagoras recom-
mends prominently targetmotivations that are distinctively spirited
from the perspective of tripartite theory. (I will henceforth refer
simply to ‘spirited motivations’ in the earlier dialogues, as short-
hand for ‘motivations identified as spirited under tripartite psycho-
logy’, without taking a position on whether tripartition is somehow
latently present or implicit in the earlier dialogues.)
Protagoras’ Great Speech indicates, then, that democratic cul-
ture and the many serve as the main agents of moral education,
and that they do so largely by influencing a young person’s spir-
ited motivations. His speech also gestures, however, at what Plato
takes to be the inadequacy of democratic education: it fails to dis-
tinguish what is truly just and admirable from what is merely con-
sidered just and admirable in a given society such as Athens. The
democratic programme is designed to promote the inculcation of
established traditions and obedience to a given set of laws, but it
is not equipped to guarantee that a society’s inherited values are
the correct ones, and it cannot, therefore, assure true as opposed to
merely apparent virtue.This weakness of democratic education is
hinted at in at least two ways. First, Protagoras observes that it is
considered madness for any man to admit that he is unjust, even if
he really is. Rather, people believe that ‘everyone ought to claim to
 See also discussion in Cairns, Aidōs, –, who observes that Protagoras is
promoting ‘a valued disposition encompassing a sense of the ways in which one’s
own honour and status are bound up with those of others’.
 This is true despite the fact that, as we will see in sect. , the education Prota-
goras describes has much in common, at least in outline, with the programme that
Socrates actually recommends in the Republic.
 See discussion of this issue in Cairns, Aidōs, ; Coby, Protagoras, ; and
A. Sesonske, ‘Hedonism in the Protagoras’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
(), – at –. Some commentators who emphasize this line of thought—
including P. Friedländer, Platon, ii. Die Platonischen Schriften (Berlin, ), ;
A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Works (London, ), –; G. Vlastos,
‘Introduction’, in id. (ed.), Plato: Protagoras (New York, ), vii–lvi at xii–ix; and
M. B. McCoy, ‘Protagoras on Human Nature, Wisdom, and the Good: The Great
Speech and the Hedonism of Plato’s Protagoras’, Ancient Philosophy,  (), –
—find in the culturally relativistic implications of the Great Speeches traces of
Protagoras’ famous Man–Measure Doctrine. I am sympathetic to such readings, al-
though nothing in my present argument depends on them.
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be just, whether they are or not’, and that ‘it is madness not to pre-
tend to possess justice’ (  –).The implication is clearly that
the democratic system encourages or produces the mere appearance
of justice, rather than true virtue, and that it thereby gives rise to
individuals who may be willing to deceive their fellow citizens and
commit injustice in secret.
Second, Protagoras tellingly compares the way the many collec-
tively teach virtue to the way they collectively teach Greek. He
mockingly says, ‘You’re spoiled, Socrates, because everyone here is a
teacher of virtue, to the best of his ability, yet you can’t see a single
one. You might as well look for a teacher of Greek; you wouldn’t
find a single one of those either!’ (  –  ). His comment
subtly betrays the culturally variable nature of the education he ad-
vocates. It is true that any society is equipped to teach a language
to its young, but which language it teaches is a matter of conven-
tion that varies from one society to the next—a line of thought
that was, moreover, familiar to Plato and his audience. The obvi-
ous problem, from Plato’s perspective, is that what is virtuous and
admirable, unlike language, is not relative to convention. Demo-
cratic education will be effective in establishing true virtue, there-
fore, only if democracy and the many who populate it uniformly
promote the correct values. Plato does not perform modus tollens
on that conditional in the Protagoras itself, but by having the so-
phist defend Athenian education in a way that draws attention to its
conservative and fallible character, Plato makes room for identify-
ing the problem with democratic culture: the many’s impoverished
 Significantly, the word for ‘pretend’ used here, προσποιούμενον, is the same word
used in theGorgias to characterize the way that the various forms of flattery ‘pretend’
to be true crafts (προσποιεῖται,   ;   ; cf   ).
 This implication is reinforced later in the text when Protagoras is led through
Socrates’ questioning towards the conclusion that, at least on the view of the demo-
cratic many, prudence and sound deliberation mean achieving beneficial results
through injustice ( –). It is, moreover, corroborated outside the Protagoras by
book  of the Republic, where Adeimantus explains that according to the education
Athenians offer their young, what matters is not being just, but rather seeming just
( –).
 We find a version of it in the First Alcibiades ( – ), for instance, and in
the Dissoi Logoi we find another argument concerned with the teachability of virtue
that appeals to the same language analogy cited by Protagoras, but which adds: ‘If
someone does not believe that we can learn words, but that we are born knowing
them, let him consider this: if one sent off a child to Persia as soon as he was born
and the child was raised there without hearing the Greek language, he would speak
Persian. If someone should bring a child here from there, he would speak Greek’
(. ).
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and largely mistaken ideas about what is virtuous, admirable, and
good. Given the conspicuous presence of a spirited Alcibiades in
the dialogue, alongside allusions to Socrates’ alleged influence on
him, it is reasonable to conclude that Protagoras’ speech is partly in-
tended to suggest a diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades: that the
democratic many themselves, not Socrates, are primarily respon-
sible for the downfall of promising young men.
.. Gorgias
The position hinted at by the Protagoras comes into sharper fo-
cus in the Gorgias. Alcibiades does not appear as a character in the
Gorgias, but he is mentioned in two critical passages in the dialogue.
The first occurs immediately after Callicles takes over the argument
from Polus:
Well, Callicles . . . I realize that you and I are both now actually sharing
a common experience: each of the two of us is a lover of two objects, I
of Alcibiades, Cleinias’ son, and of philosophy, and you of the Athenian
dēmos, and the Demos who’s the son of Pyrilampes. I notice that in each
case you’re unable to contradict your beloved, clever though you are, no
matter what he says or what he claims is so. You keep shifting back and
forth. If you say anything in the Assembly and the Athenian dēmos denies
 Some critics have denied that there are any signs of cultural relativism in the
Great Speech, or indeed that Plato is critical towards its content at all. G. B. Ker-
ferd, ‘Protagoras’ Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the Protagoras of Plato’, Journal
of Hellenic Studies,  (), – at , comments, ‘It has been objected that [Pro-
tagoras’] argument involves the identification of goodness with the actual traditions
of an existing civilized state . . . This is surely a perverse criticism. The virtue with
which Protagoras is concerned is repeatedly stated to be the condition of all cities—
without it no Polis can exist . . . His function cannot be merely therefore to ex-
press and teach what the community already believes.’ (See also G. L. Kustas and
S. Moser, ‘A Comment on the “Relativism” of the Protagoras’, Phoenix,  (),
–; and H. G. Wolz, ‘Hedonism in the Protagoras’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy,  (), – at –.) Even if Kerferd’s point is correct, however,
I do not think it affects my main argument. Even if Protagoras does advocate, or
takes himself to be advocating, the existence of objective standards of value, that still
leaves open the question whether the democratic educational system he describes is
qualified to teach those values, as opposed to its own (more or less convention-based)
values. Protagoras clearly presupposes that it is so qualified, but that certainly does
not mean that Plato shares his view, nor does it rule out the possibility that Plato
intends to draw his readers’ attention to his concerns about the Athenian system.
 The fact that the author of theFirst Alcibiades clearly has theProtagoras inmind
when he has Alcibiades explain how he was educated seems to provide some addi-
tional corroboration for this reading. When Socrates asks Alcibiades from whom he
has learnt justice, Alcibiades replies that he learnt it from the many, just as he learnt
Greek from them ( – ).
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it, you shift your ground and say what it wants to hear. Other things like
this happen to you when you’re with that good-looking young man, the son
of Pyrilampes. You’re unable to oppose what your beloveds say or propose,
so that if somebody heard you say what you do on their account and was
amazed at how laughable it is, you’d probably say—if you were minded to
tell him the truth—that unless somebody stops your beloveds from saying
what they say, you’ll never stop saying these things either. In that case you
must believe that you’re bound to hear me say things like that, too, and
instead of being surprised at my saying them, you must stop my beloved,
philosophy, from saying them. For she always says what you now hear me
say, my dear friend, and she’s by far less fickle than my other beloved. As
for that son of Cleinias, what he says differs from one time to the next.
(  –  )
The second mention of Alcibiades occurs at the conclusion of Soc-
rates’ critical remarks about Pericles and other renowned Athenian
statesmen. Socrates argues that such leaders made the city ‘swollen
and festering’ by satisfying the democracy’s appetites indiscrimi-
nately, but that the citizens do not know who is truly to blame for
their diseased condition. Instead, they sing the praises of Pericles
and others who are truly at fault, while blaming their advisers of
the moment. Socrates then warns: ‘Perhaps, if you’re not careful,
they’ll lay their hands on you, and on my friend Alcibiades, when
they lose not only what they gained but what they had originally
as well, even though you aren’t the real causes of their ills, but if
anything only auxiliary causes’ (  – ).
Socrates’ references to Alcibiades occur in contexts that, as in the
Protagoras, also include all of the following: emphasis on spirited
motivation; allusions to the death of Socrates on the charge of cor-
rupting the youth; and attention to the pernicious role of the many
in moral education. Concerning spirited motivation, it is signifi-
cant that both mentions of Alcibiades take place during Socrates’
exchange with Callicles (the first immediately after Callicles takes
over the conversation), with whom Alcibiades has a great deal in
common. Most importantly for present purposes, Plato portrays
 A number of commentators have drawn attention to the striking parallels and
similarities between Alcibiades and Callicles, and some have even gone so far as to
suggest that the character of Callicles is a thin mask for Alcibiades himself. While
I find this conclusion overly speculative, certainly it seems fair to conclude, with
Ramsey, ‘Response’, , that ‘We can feel some confidence in taking the Gorgias to
present an image of the character and inclinations of the Alcibiades-type . . . [Plato]
at least intended us to have [Alcibiades] in mind.’ See also discussion in Dodds,
Gorgias, –, and Gribble, Alcibiades, –.
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Callicles as another exemplar of strong spirited tendencies and con-
cerns. The very first words out of Callicles’ mouth—and the open-
ing words of the dialogue—are ‘war and battle’ (πολέμου καὶ μάχης,
  ), and he is quick to perceive ‘love of victory’ as Socrates’
motivation in the argument (  ), thereby betraying his own
understanding of their conversation as a contest. He is also an am-
bitious politician ( –), he is deeply interested inwhat it takes to
achieve ‘reputation’ in one’s city ( –;  –), and he believes
that someone who seeks power ‘should either be a ruler himself in
his city or even be a tyrant’ ( –). Once Callicles becomes Soc-
rates’ main interlocutor, moreover, the emotion of shame and the
virtue of courage become central. Callicles distinguishes between
natural and conventional standards of what is admirable and shame-
ful, and he criticizes Socrates for exploiting his interlocutors’ sense
of (conventional) shame. He claims that in fact it requires great
boldness and courage to lack shame in front of the many, and those
who espouse conventional views do so merely out of weakness and
cowardice. Hence Callicles takes pride in his shamelessness, identi-
fying it with (the spirited qualities of) boldness and courage and
attributing it only to those who are superior to the crowd.
Socrates’ references also occur alongside heavy-handed allusions
to the charges brought against Socrates and to his ultimate trial
 By convention, Callicles claims, it is shameful to get more than one’s share and
to indulge one’s appetites without restraint, but by nature it is admirable to do those
things. Significantly, Alcibiades is also a paragon of the sort of self-indulgent lack
of restraint promoted by Callicles. Xenophon calls Alcibiades the ‘most licentious’
(ἀκρατέστατος) man in all of Athens (Mem. . . ).
 Socrates exploits Callicles’ sense of pride in his ‘courageous’ shamelessness at
key points in their conversation, e.g. ‘You certainly won’t be shocked or feel shame;
for you see, you are a courageous man’ ( ; cf.  –;  ;  ). In fact, spir-
itedmotivations—in particular, shame—play a role throughout theGorgias, but they
become especially prominent through the character of Callicles. Their role in the
dialogue has been much discussed by commentators, including G. R. Carone, ‘Cal-
culatingMachines or Leaky Jars? TheMoral Psychology of Plato’sGorgias’,Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at – and –; J. M. Cooper,
‘Socrates and Plato in Plato’s Gorgias’, in id., Reason and Emotion, –; D. B.
Futter, ‘Shame as a Tool for Persuasion in Plato’sGorgias’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy,  (), –; and especially J. Moss, ‘Shame, Pleasure, and the Di-
vided Soul’ [‘Shame’],Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –. One
caveat that should be added to the above is that although Callicles is distinguished
by especially strong spirited motivations, we need not liken him to the ‘timocratic
individual’ described in Republic , who is ‘ruled’ by his θυμοειδές. Indeed, there are
reasons for thinking that he is much more like the democratic or even tyrannical in-
dividual of that dialogue than the timocratic one. See discussion in Dodds, Gorgias,
–, and also n.  below.
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and death. In Callicles’ extended speech, which is his immediate
response to the comments that contain Socrates’ first mention of
Alcibiades, he speaks of the danger of spending too much time in
philosophy. He warns Socrates, ‘If someone got hold of you or of
anyone else like you and took you off to prison on the charge that
you’re doing something unjust when in fact you aren’t, you can
know that you wouldn’t be able to help yourself . . . You’d come up
for trial and face some no good wretch of an accuser and be put to
death, if death is what he’d want as the penalty’ (  – ). Later,
immediately following his second reference to Alcibiades, Socrates
himself concedes that if he were ever brought to court by an unjust
man, it is not unlikely that he would be put to death. He would be
judged, he says, as a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if
brought to trial by a pastry chef. He explains, ‘For I won’t be able
to point out any pleasures that I’ve provided for them, ones they
believe to be services and benefits . . . nor will I be able to speak the
truth if someone charges that I corrupt the youth by confusing them
or abuse older ones by speaking bitter words against them in pub-
lic or private . . . So presumably I’ll get whatever comes my way’
(  – ). Here, alongside a reference to Alcibiades and criti-
cism of the respected democratic leader who was his guardian, Soc-
rates predicts precisely the charge—corrupting the youth—which
in the minds of Plato’s readers was so closely associated with his
relationship with Alcibiades and his perceived hostility to demo-
cratic practices.
Finally, Socrates’ references to Alcibiades occur in contexts that
draw attention to the corrupting role of the democratic many in
moral education. Callicles himself, to begin with, characterizes
democratic educational practices along the same lines as those
found in Protagoras’ Great Speech: ‘I believe that the people who
institute our laws are the weak and the many. They do this, and
they assign praise and blame with themselves and their own ad-
vantage in mind . . . and so they say that getting more than one’s
share is “shameful” and “unjust” and that doing what’s unjust is
trying to get more than one’s share’ (  – ). In this way the
many ‘mould’ young men ‘like lion cubs’ ( – ). Although
Callicles’ attitude towards Athenian values is much more critical
than Protagoras’, their ways of characterizing the process of moral
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education in a democracy are consonant with one another: in both
cases the many instil values in the young through the assignment of
praise and blame and by shaping the youths’ attitudes about what is
admirable and shameful, just and unjust. Again, then, we find that
early education occurs largely by targeting a class of distinctively
spirited motivations. This impression is perhaps reinforced by
Callicles’ choice of analogy: in Plato’s image of the tripartite soul
in Republic , he represents the spirited part of the soul as a ‘lion’.
The Gorgias goes further towards an indictment of the many,
however, in two ways. First, whereas Plato does not directly or ex-
plicitly call the many’s values into question in the Protagoras, in the
GorgiasSocrates’ attitude towards themany is expressly critical and
dismissive throughout. Most importantly in the present context,
in the two passages that refer to Alcibiades Socrates indicates that
the many ‘shift back and forth’ in their views and also argues at
length that the many assign praise and blame incorrectly: in their
ignorance of what is good and bad for them, they ‘sing the praises’
of those responsible for their misfortune while wrongly blaming
others. If early moral education occurs largely through the incul-
cation of the many’s views about what is admirable and shameful,
praiseworthy and blameworthy, and if those views are unstable and
misguided, then the implication is that the democratic many them-
selves are a corrupting influence on young men such as Alcibiades.
The Gorgias also contains a second and perhaps deeper worry,
though, that bears especially on individuals like Callicles and Al-
 Both are also consistent, I take it, with the account offered by Adeimantus in
Republic .
 In doing so Plato follows an established tradition in Greek literature, which
often associates spiritedness with lions. See e.g. Pind. Isthm. . –: ‘In the toil of
conflict [Melissus] resembles the θυμός of loud-roaring lions in his daring.’ Signifi-
cantly, the lion is also used as a symbol of Alcibiades himself in both Aristophanes’
Frogs (–) and Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades (. ). Moreover, the only fully sur-
viving quotation from Phaedo’s dialogue Zopyrus—which features Socrates and Al-
cibiades searching for a teacher—reads: ‘They say, Socrates, that the youngest son
of the king was given a lion cub as a gift . . . And it seems to me that the lion, having
been raised with the boy while he was young, followed him wherever he went, so
that the Persians said the lion was in love with the boy’ (G. Giannantoni, Socratis
et Socraticorum reliquiae, i (Naples, ), III.  ). Plausibly, Phaedo is following
Aristophanes and others in using the Persian lion as a metaphor for Alcibiades. For
discussion of the lion analogy in theGorgias see Dodds,Gorgias, –, and Ramsey,
‘Response’, .
 For example, he identifies the crowds found in law courts and the assembly as
‘those who lack knowledge’ ( ; cf.  – ), and he says that he ‘disregards’
the many and does not even bother to discuss things with them ( –).
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cibiades: those who possess especially strong spirited desires, and
who are especially ambitious and eager to achieve power and fame,
will be especially prone to the deleterious influence of the many. In
the passage quoted above, Socrates notably tells Callicles that he is
a ‘lover of the Athenian dēmos’ (  –; cf.   )—a remark
which, on the face of it, seems contradicted by Callicles’ own evi-
dent contempt for the democratic many, to whom he clearly con-
siders himself superior. A parallel occurs in the First Alcibiades,
where Socrates calls Alcibiades a ‘lover of the people’ (δημεραστής,
  ), despite the young Alcibiades’ obvious sense of superior-
ity to them. The Platonic point behind these characterizations is
that those who wish to achieve success and honour in a place like
Athens must necessarily ingratiate themselves to the many. As
Socrates indicates earlier in the Gorgias during his exchange with
Polus, those who aspire to exert political influence in democratic
law courts and assemblies must make use of oratorical practices that
appeal, not to what is truly best, but to what the many, in their ig-
norance of what is best, find pleasing. Hence even the most suc-
cessful Athenian politicians, including Pericles and Themistocles,
are like pastry chefs who merely ‘flatter’ the appetites of the many.
Given Callicles’ ambitions, then, Socrates advises him:
[You] should now be making yourself as much like the Athenian people as
possible if you expect to endear yourself to them and have great power in
the city . . . If you think that some person or other will hand you a craft
of the sort that will give you great power in this city while you are unlike
the regime, whether for better or for worse, then in my opinion, Callicles,
you’re not well-advised. You mustn’t be their imitator but be naturally like
them in your own person if you expect to achieve any genuine success in
winning the friendship of the Athenian dēmos . . . For each group of people
takes delight in speeches given in its own character, and resents those given
in an alien manner. (  – )
The implication of the passage is clear. Those who seek honour
and power must assimilate themselves to the people on whom
their honour and power depend: the many teach unstable and
often misguided values, and the successful politician or orator
 Cf. Thuc. . . , where Pericles encourages Athenians to be ‘lovers’ (ἐραστάς)
of their city.
 See the excellent discussion of this issue in J. Moss, ‘The Doctor and the Pastry
Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias’, Ancient Philosophy,  (),
– at –.
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must internalize them. Indeed, there are already signs of such
assimilation in Callicles himself: ‘many of the Athenians’ would
attest to his good education ( ); what he says constantly ‘shifts
back and forth’ in accordance with the whims of the many (just
as what Alcibiades says ‘differs from one time to the next’); in
spite of himself, he cannot help feeling shame that conforms to
conventional views ( ); and finally, his hedonistic conception
of value reflects the appetitive nature of the democratic many.
What Plato shows us, then, is that it is the fate of the spirit-driven
and ambitious in a democracy to become as corrupt as the populace
they disdain. In doing so, they also run the risk that the democracy
will ultimately turn against them for the very corruption of which
the many themselves are the cause, as Socrates warns might happen
to both Callicles and Alcibiades.
Although Alcibiades is mentioned in only two passages in the
Gorgias, then, they occur alongside allusions to Socrates’ trial and
at critical points in the unfolding of Plato’s concerns about the role
of the many in moral education. Clearly Plato intends his readers to
see the implications of the dialogue for the case of Alcibiades and
thereby intends to offer resources for diagnosing the cause of the
notorious Athenian’s downfall.
.. Symposium
In the Symposium Plato addresses the problem of Alcibiades in a
way that is much more direct than what we find in the Protagoras or
Gorgias: through the testimony of Alcibiades himself. In a crucial
 Callicles’ proposal that a happy life consists in having as many appetites as pos-
sible and satisfying them all indiscriminately ( – ) is strikingly similar to
the characterization of the democratic individual and regimes of Republic . Note
that it is perfectly consistent with (indeed, even predicted by) my reading of the text
to think that Callicles now seeks power in the city largely as a means of satisfying
his appetitive desires, having already been to a large extent corrupted by the many.
The idea is that promising and especially ambitious individuals such as Callicles or
Alcibiades start off with strong and distinctively spirited desires for honour and rule
(like Alcibiades in theFirst Alcibiades), but that given the necessity of assimilating to
the many in order to achieve those, they become increasingly corrupt, with increas-
ingly strong and varied appetites alongside their spirited desires (like Alcibiades in
the Symposium). See also nn.  and .
 Pausanias’ speech on the supremacy of Athenian law is also relevant here, in
that it draws attention to the conventional nature of law and hence performs some-
thing like the function of the Great Speech in the Protagoras (as I understand it).
See comments in R. G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato [Symposium] (Cambridge,
), xxv–xxvii.
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passage in which Alcibiades explains his relationship with Socrates,
he states:
He always compels me to agree with him that, despite the fact that my own
shortcomings cry out for attention, I neglect myself and waste my time on
the affairs of the Athenians . . . Socrates is the only man in the world who
has made me feel shame [αἰσχύνεσθαι]—ah, you didn’t think I had it in me,
did you? Yes, he makes me feel ashamed [αἰσχύνομαι]: I know perfectly well
that I can’t prove he’s wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the
moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I am overcome by the
honour I receive from the many [ἡττημένῳ τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν].
My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep
away, but when I see him, I feel ashamed [αἰσχύνομαι] in the light of what
we have previously agreed upon. (  – )
These comments and their immediate context contain the marks of
Plato’s engagement with the problem of Alcibiades that we have ob-
served in the other dialogues. First, they highlight the importance
of spirited motivation in his moral development. Alcibiades de-
scribes two influences on his psychology and behaviour—Socrates
and the many—both of which affect him (perhaps not exclusively,
but saliently) through his spirited desires and emotions.His testi-
mony reveals, firstly, that Alcibiades experiences shame in the pre-
sence of Socrates in a way that is morally salutary: his spirited sense
of shame motivates him to live up to standards of virtue to which
Socrates, and the love of wisdom that Socrates has inspired in him,
 It should be noted, however, that Alcibiades, as he appears in the Symposium,
should not necessarily be taken to be ‘ruled by spirit’ in the sense outlined inRepub-
lic . All that matters is that he is presented as having strong spirited motivations
as a prominent feature of his psychology, whatever the structure of that psychology
might be. Indeed, while I think the young Alcibiades of theFirst Alcibiades (and per-
haps the Protagoras) does approximate the timocratic individual of the Republic—a
reading corroborated by Proclus (In Alc. –)—I am sympathetic to Hobbs’s sug-
gestions (Hero, ) that in the Symposium, at least, Alcibiades is ‘a disturbing ex-
ample of a timocrat sinking into the chaotic existence of the democratic anarchist’.
Cf. discussion of Alcibiades’ psychology in K. Corrigan and E. Glazov-Corrigan,
Plato’s Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and Myth in the Symposium [Dia-
lectic] (University Park, Penn., ), – and ; and in Gribble, Alcibiades,
– and –.
 Spirited motivations are, in fact, prominent in the character of Alcibiades
throughout his appearance, and his encomium of Socrates focuses heavily on praise,
honour, shame, admiration, and courage: Alcibiades feels ‘dishonoured’ (ἠτιμᾶσθαι,
  ) by Socrates and vows to ‘exact his revenge’ (τιμωρήσωμαι,   ), and he
admires Socrates’ courage (  ), endurance (  ;   ), and performance
in battle (  ).
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have drawn him. He also reveals, however, that his spirited love
of honour actually pulls him away from virtue. In particular, his
desire for esteem leads him towards a corrupt way of life in the pre-
sence of the many, who do not share philosophic values and among
whom he seeks to achieve power and glory. Hence we find expli-
citly what the earlier two dialogues to a lesser or greater degree im-
plied: that the democratic many are responsible for corrupting Al-
cibiades, and they do so by way of his boundless desire for their
honour and esteem.
Here we can also perceive a tension inherent in Alcibiades’ re-
lationship with the many. On the one hand, he considers himself
superior to them and, as a result, does not admire them and feels
no shame in their presence. On the other hand, he also seeks to
be admired by them and to achieve power among them, and con-
sequently he is at the mercy of those he considers inferior. This is
precisely the tensionwe observed above in the character of Callicles,
 The possibility of a positive role for spirited emotion is, in fact, one that is
introduced and developed earlier in the dialogue, most notably in Phaedrus’ open-
ing speech. Phaedrus argues that the most effective forces for inspiring virtue, and
the necessary conditions for living well, are ‘a sense of shame in acting shamefully
and a love of honour in acting admirably’ (τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ
τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν,   –). Phaedrus’ characterization echoes Lysias, who ac-
cuses Alcibiades of ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς φιλοτιμεῖσθαι (In
Alc. I ). Significantly, perhaps, Phaedrus argues that lovers would never abandon
their weapons or desert the ranks, crimes of which Alcibiades’ own son was later
accused (see Lys. In Alc. I and II). Also relevant is Socrates’ report of Diotima’s
account of ‘love of honour’ (φιλοτιμία,   ff.). Hobbs (Hero, ch. ) provides an ex-
cellent analysis of the role of spirited motivation in the dialogue. Further discussion
of possibly tripartite and spirited psychology in the Symposium is offered in Cairns,
Aidōs, –; Sheffield,Desire, –; A. Nehamas, ‘Only in the Contemplation of
Beauty is Human Life Worth Living: Plato, Symposium  ’, European Journal of
Philosophy,  (), – at ; and J. Reid, ‘Unfamiliar Voices: Harmonizing the
Non-Socratic Speeches and Plato’s Psychology’, in P. Destrée and Z. Giannopoulou
(eds.), Plato’s Symposium: A Critical Guide (Cambridge, forthcoming).
 Alcibiades’ remarks show not only that spirited motivations can pull a person
either towards or away from virtue, but also that a single individual can experi-
ence vacillation in his spirited emotions in the alternating presence of competing
sources of honour and admiration. Note that the conflict is not, however, the sort
that would—given the Republic’s Principle of Opposites—generate a subpartition-
ing of the spirited part of the soul itself: it is diachronic, not synchronic. Cf. Sheffield,
Desire, –.
 Commentators who discuss this passage and issues related to it include Hobbs,
Hero, –; C. D. C. Reeve, ‘A Study in Violets: Alcibiades in the Symposium’
[‘Violets’], in J. H. Lesher, D. Nails, and F. C. C. Sheffield (eds.), Plato’s Sym-
posium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception (Washington, ), – at ;
andM. Sharpe, ‘RevaluingMegalopsuchia: Reflections on theAlcibiades II’, in John-
son and Tarrant (eds.), Alcibiades, – at –.
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who—like Alcibiades—draws attention to his lack of shame in the
face of the many, but who has political aspirations that require their
approval.As theRepublic testifies, those who love honourwill ulti-
mately accept it fromwhatever source offers it, even if they hold that
source in low esteem ( –). The latent conflict between a man’s
shamelessness in the face of a democratic many he holds in low re-
gard, on the one hand, and his desire to be admired and honoured
by them nonetheless, on the other, is one that Plato evidently takes
to be distinctive of talented and ambitious individuals in a place
like Athens. It is a conflict, moreover, that he considers not only
morally problematic, but also—as Alcibiades’ speech makes clear—
psychologically troubling to those introspective enough to recog-
nize it.
Finally, Alcibiades’ speech as a whole contains numerous allu-
 This is a point that is also anticipated earlier in the Symposium. During Soc-
rates’ exchange with Agathon, the young man claims to disregard the opinion of
the many, an attitude which leads Socrates to suggest that Agathon might (like Al-
cibiades) feel no shame in acting disgracefully in front of them. At the same time,
however, Agathon’s success as an ambitious poet relies on the approval of the very
theatre crowd he claims to ignore.
 It might be objected that if Alcibiades is shameless in front of the many, then he
cannot really have internalized their values in the inevitable way I have suggested.
There are several lines of response to this worry, however. () The defining value of
democracy is freedom (Rep.  ), on Plato’s view, and Alcibiades’ behaviour em-
bodies that value to the extreme. () Shamelessness is actually one of the essential
ingredients of the democratic regime in the Republic ( ). () One of the distin-
guishing features of democratic values, especially as Plato understands them, is that
they promote doing injustice whenever one can get away with it. Alcibiades is simply
someone who, given his natural and material resources, can get away with a lot more
than most people. Andocides provides a useful illustration. Writing in the voice of
Phaeax, he complains: ‘It makes me angry to think that while you yourselves cannot
place even malefactors under arrest without risk . . . Alcibiades, who imprisoned
[Agatharchus] for such a long time and forced him to paint, went unpunished—nay,
increased thereby the awe and the fear in which he is held’ (In Alc. ). Because
Alcibiades is able to commit shameful and even unjust acts with impunity, there is
nothing in his democratic education to encourage him to do otherwise. () As Ando-
cides’ speech testifies, Alcibiades’ shameless behaviour actually earns him the honour
and admiration of his fellow citizens, even if they do find that behaviour reprehens-
ible. In short, then, Alcibiades is the consummate product of the democracy, with
all its flaws. Gribble, Alcibiades, –, offers an excellent analysis of Alcibiades’
relation to the democracy.
 For alternative explanations of the Symposium’s account of Socrates’ failure to
educate Alcibiades see A. Hooper, ‘The Dual-Role Philosophers: An Exploration
of a Failed Relationship’, in Johnson and Tarrant (eds.), Alcibiades, – at ;
Sheffield, Desire, – (though Sheffield does acknowledge some role for Alcibi-
ades’ love of honour); and P. Woodruff, ‘Socrates and the Irrational’, in N. D. Smith
and P. Woodruff (eds.), Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy (Oxford, ),
– at –.
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sions to the role his relationship with Socrates played in the latter’s
trial. Alcibiades prefaces his speech by saying that he is going to
‘exact his punishment’ on Socrates ( ), and he tells his com-
panions that they are ‘members of the jury’ who must stand in
judgement over Socrates ( ); and Alcibiades’ speech contains
allusions both to the Sicilian campaign ( ) and to the profana-
tion of the Mysteries ( )—two of the most notorious incidents
with which he, Alcibiades, eventually became associated, and which
would have been prominent in the minds of those reflecting on Soc-
rates’ trial. These overt allusions to Socrates’ conviction on the
charge of corrupting the youth make it doubly clear that Plato in-
tends us to understand Alcibiades’ indictment of the many in an
apologetic light. We can conclude, therefore, that in having Alcibi-
ades confront the issue of his downfall in a context that calls tomind
the trial of Socrates, Plato thereby attempts to offer a diagnosis of
the problem of Alcibiades: his corruption was due not to Socra-
tes, but to the democratic many themselves—the very people who
condemned Socrates. In other words, it is not Socrates, but rather
Athens itself, that is guilty of corrupting the youth.
.. Republic 
If the preceding three dialogues in various ways draw attention to
both a role for spirited motivation in moral education and the cor-
rupting influence of the democratic many on promising youths, the
Republic confirms and accounts for these points in more detail. In
book , in the course of defending his claim that the city should be
entrusted only to those endowed with a ‘philosophic nature’, Soc-
rates provides an explanation of howmost people who actually pos-
sess such a nature are typically corrupted and compelled to aban-
don philosophy. It is here that we find Plato offering, arguably more
fully than anywhere else, the philosophical resources for diagnosing
the problem of Alcibiades.
Socrates begins by suggesting, paradoxically, that the very qua-
lities that constitute a philosophic nature—along with other pu-
 The apologetic and historical context of the Symposium is discussed in Bury,
Symposium, lxiv–lxv; Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan,Dialectic, –; Gribble,Al-
cibiades, –; M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, ), – and p.  n. ; Sheffield, De-
sire, , –, and  n. ; and V. Wohl, ‘The Eros of Alcibiades’, Classical
Antiquity,  (), –.
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tative goods such as beauty, wealth, and powerful relatives—also
contribute to the corruption of that nature ( –). The reason is
that a young person endowed with exceptional traits and resources
will, precisely because of the promise he shows, be exploited by his
fellow citizens and associates, who will flatter and honour him in
hope of securing his favour. The inevitable result, Socrates says,
is that such a young man will ‘be filled with impractical expecta-
tions and think himself capable of managing the affairs, not only
of the Greeks, but of the barbarians as well’, and will become full
of ‘empty pride that lacks intelligence’ ( –). Socrates asks, ‘If
someone approaches a young man in that condition and gently tells
him the truth, namely, that there’s no understanding in him, that
he needs it, and that it can’t be acquired unless he works like a slave
to attain it, do you think it will be easy for him to listen when he’s
in the midst of so many evils?’ (  –). Even if the young man
were to be drawn to philosophy, moreover, his fellow citizens would
do anything to keep him away from it, including plotting against,
or taking to court, the one who drew him to it ( –). In the ab-
sence of philosophical guidance, however, young men will receive
their only ‘education’ from themany themselves. Socrates explains:
When the many are sitting together in assemblies, law courts, theatres,
army camps, or in some other public gathering of the crowd, they cast
blame very loudly and excessively on some of the things that are said or
done and they praise others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so
that the very rocks and surroundings echo the noise of their praise or blame
and double it. In circumstances like that, what is the effect, as they say, on
a young person’s heart? What private instruction can hold out and not be
swept away by that kind of praise or blame and be carried by the flood
wherever it goes, so that he’ll say the same things are admirable or shame-
ful as the crowd does, follow the same way of life as they do, and be the
same sort of person as they are? (  – )
In this way the many turn the young into ‘precisely the kind of
people they want them to be’ (  –). This improper ‘educa-
tion’, Socrates explains, has its most harmful effects on those with
a philosophic endowment: just as they are the ones capable of ex-
traordinary good, so also, when raised improperly, they are cap-
able of extraordinary wickedness. As a result of their corruption by
the many, therefore, the best-natured youths end up being those
who do ‘the greatest evil to cities and individuals’ (τὰ μέγιστα κακά,
  ).
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Socrates’ account attributes the many’s corrupting influence to
two main ways in which they impact on the spirited element of a
young person’s psychology. The first is that the many shape a per-
son’s sense of what is admirable and shameful. Through their cla-
morous praise and blame, they ‘teach’ a young man which kinds
of behaviour, and which kinds of people, they deem worthy of ho-
nour or dishonour. This kind of influence is exacerbated in the case
of those with ambition in the city—whether it be in poetry or poli-
tics, Socrates says—who are ‘compelled’ to act in the ways themany
deem praiseworthy if they want to achieve success ( –). Be-
cause what the many praise is not truly admirable (and what they
blame not truly shameful), however, their influence leads young
men away from genuine virtue and philosophy. The second way the
many corrupt the young—in particular, the best among them—is by
honouring them excessively. This has the effect of giving a young
man the false impression that he is already worthy of great power
and honour, and hence that he does not need to subject himself to
the rigorous self-improvement demanded by philosophy. Both of
these methods exploit a young person’s spirited desire for honour
and his sensitivity to what earns the praise and esteem—or blame
and censure—of his fellow citizens.
Although Alcibiades is never mentioned by name, book ’s ac-
count is filled with allusions to him and his relationship with Soc-
rates, including striking parallels to Alcibiades’ autobiographical
remarks in the Symposium. The Republic’s account includes, in
addition, an allusion to Socrates’ trial: those who try to lead the
best young men towards philosophy will be ‘plotted against’ and
‘brought to court’. The Republic also points to beauty, wealth, phy-
sical strength, and ‘relatives who are powerful in the city’—all qua-
lities superlatively attributed to Alcibiades—as the resources that
make an exceptional young man the object of the many’s flattery
and honour. Finally, Plato’s intention to bring to mind Alcibiades
in Republic  is attested by Alcibiades I and II, along with Plut-
 In both accounts, for instance, a young man is approached privately and per-
suaded that he is like a ‘slave’, and he feels drawn to philosophy but is ultimately
ruined by the honour of the many. The reference to those who do ‘the greatest evil
to cities’ also recalls Xenophon’s report that, according to Socrates’ accuser, Alcibi-
ades (and Critias) ‘did great evil to the city’ (Mem. . . ).
 In theSymposiumAlcibiades reports in similar terms that Socrates, by contrast,
cares nothing about the beauty, wealth, or fame that are valued by the crowd, and
that he refused the offer of Alcibiades’ bodily beauty and possessions.
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arch’s Life of Alcibiades, all of which clearly draw on its account
of the many’s role in corrupting young men in their depictions of
Alcibiades.
Given the above evidence, a number of commentators have
rightly taken Republic  to allude to Socrates’ failed efforts to
rehabilitate Alcibiades. If that is the case, then the Republic vin-
dicates Alcibiades’ own claim in theSymposium that the democratic
many kept him away from Socrates and philosophy. In doing so, it
confirms the diagnosis that is sketched in the Protagoras, Gorgias,
and Symposium.
. Solution to the problem of Alcibiades
I would now like to propose that the diagnosis of the problem of Al-
cibiades signalled in book  is importantly connected to two other
central Platonic views that are introduced in the Republic: its ac-
counts of the soul and of early education. Onmy interpretation, the
Republic’s tripartite account of psychology provides the theoretical
basis both for Plato’s diagnosis of Alcibiades’ downfall and for the
dialogue’s positive educational programme. Moral education in the
Kallipolis, moreover, is designed at least in part as a solution to the
problem of Alcibiades: it aims to eliminate and prevent the sorts
of problem that led to Alcibiades’ corruption and downfall. I will
begin with a brief analysis of how theRepublic’s theories of the soul
and education fulfil these roles, and I will conclude with some re-
marks on the significance of this picture for our understanding of
the development of Plato’s thought.
.. Early education and the spirited part of the soul
To begin with, the introduction of a tripartite soul in the Repub-
lic provides the resources for explaining the many’s corruption of
 See esp. Alc. I  –  and  ; Alc. II  –; and Plut. Alc. . – and
. –.
 See e.g. J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, ii (Cambridge, ), ; Gribble,Al-
cibiades, –; Reeve, ‘Violets’,  n. ; Taylor, Protagoras, ; and Waterfield,
‘Quest’, .
 Alcibiades’ testimony is also corroborated by the closing words of the Alcibi-
ades. When Alcibiades promises to obey Socrates and cultivate justice, Socrates re-
sponds, ‘I should like to believe that you will persevere, but I’m afraid, not because
I distrust your nature, but because I know how powerful the city is—I’m afraid it
might get the better of both me and you’ (  –).
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young men from a psychological perspective. Whereas the earlier
dialogues never offer a division of the soul—either because Plato
did not yet accept tripartite theory or because making it explicit
was orthogonal to his aims in those dialogues—the Republic expli-
citly identifies a distinct part of the embodied soul that operates (or
can operate) independently of reason, and which has a special set
of concerns centred on honour and dishonour. The thumoeides is,
moreover, a part of the soul that is fully active ‘right from birth’
( ), in contrast to the reasoning part of the soul, and which is
therefore a ready target of education (or miseducation) throughout
an individual’s youth. On this picture, the spirited element of the
soul is responsible for precisely those attitudes and desires that play
a critical role both in early moral development and in the demo-
cracy’s corruption of young men in book : the many corrupt the
young, on the Republic’s view, by exploiting and improperly shap-
ing their spirited motivations at a time in life during which those
motivations have a decisive influence on their behaviour and, ulti-
mately, the whole course of their lives.
The Republic’s recognition of the importance of a distinctively
spirited part of the soul, moreover, informs the dialogue’s posi-
tive account of early moral education. The first point to note
here is that the programme of education Socrates proposes in the
text has much in common, on the surface, with the democratic
education described by Protagoras in the Great Speech: both
advocate a combination of musical and gymnastic training; both
emphasize the use of role models for emulation by the young; both
make use of poetry; and both stress the importance of teaching
children what is praiseworthy and blameworthy, admirable and
shameful. There are, however, at least two crucial ways in which
Plato departs from, or aims to improve, the traditional picture
of moral education. First, whereas the Protagoras (along with
Gorgias and Symposium) offers no details about the psychology
that underlies moral education, in the Republic early education
exploits motivations and sensitivities that are associated with, or
explicitly attributed to, the thumoeides—praise and blame, feel-
ings of shame and honour, and the promotion of endurance and
courage. That this represents a deliberate Platonic refinement
 See esp.  – and  – . For discussion of thumoedic education in the
Republic see C. Gill, ‘Plato and the Education of Character’, Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie,  (), – at –; J. C. B. Gosling, Plato (London, ), –
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of the inherited democratic understanding of education is clear
when we compare Socrates’ characterization of the effects of music
and gymnastics on children with that of Protagoras in the Great
Speech. According to the Protagorean account, harmony and
rhythm ‘become familiar [οἰκειοῦσθαι] to the souls of the children,
so that [the children] become gentler [ἡμερώτεροι]’ (  –).
In Socrates’ account, on the other hand, music has the effect of
‘relaxing [the thumoeides] with soothing stories, and making it
gentle [ἡμεροῦσα] by means of harmony and rhythm’ (  – 
). Here rhythm and harmony do not simply make the children
gentler; rather, the children become gentle in virtue of the fact that
rhythm and harmony have made the spirited part of their souls
gentler. Likewise, Socrates claims that when children have ab-
sorbed rhythm and harmony into their souls, they will be ready to
‘warmly welcome’ (ἀσπάζοιτ’) reason as something that is ‘familiar’
(οἰκειότητα) to them (  –). His comment clearly alludes to
his earlier observation that spiritedness makes an animal friendly
towards the familiar and hostile towards the unfamiliar, and that
spirited dogs in particular ‘warmly welcome’ (ἀσπάζεται,   )
those who are known to them. In the Republic, therefore, effects
of musical education that Protagoras had registered merely on the
child or on the child’s soul in general are expressly registered on
the thumoeides.
In the case of gymnastic training, Plato’s revision of the democra-
tic account is even more pronounced and explicit. Protagoras had
warned that gymnastics must be practised in order that the young
person’s body be able to ‘assist’ his soul and thereby prevent cowar-
dice. Socrates, however, dissents from this common view. He ar-
gues that ‘a god has given music and gymnastic training to human
beings not, except incidentally, for the body and the soul, but for
the spirited and wisdom-loving elements of the soul itself ’ ( 
–). Gymnastic training, he claims, ‘arouses the spirited part’ of a
person’s nature, and, if practised properly, it makes the thumoeides
‘courageous’ ( –). Indeed, it is the spirited part of the soul that
; Lear, ‘Beauty’; Moss, ‘Shame’; A. Nehamas, ‘Beauty of Body, Nobility of Soul:
The Pursuit of Love in Plato’s Symposium’, in D. Scott (ed.), Maieusis: Essays in
Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat (Oxford, ), – at –;
R. Singpurwalla, ‘Why Spirit is the Natural Ally of Reason: Spirit, Reason, and the
Fine in Plato’sRepublic’,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –; and
J. Wilberding, ‘Plato’s Two Forms of Second-Best Morality’, Philosophical Review,
 (), –.
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is the source of courage in an individual, andwhereas the traditional
account regards gymnastics as training the body so that it can as-
sist the soul, Socrates views gymnastics as training the spirited part
of the soul so that it can assist the reasoning part ( –;  ).
Again, the parallels between the two accounts show that recognition
of the thumoeides represents a thoughtful theoretical refinement of
the more traditional, democratic model of education.
There is a second, and even more important, way in which Plato
seeks to improve on the Protagorean picture of education: he aims
to replace the unstable and misguided values of the many with
correct values. The spirited motivations that largely determine our
moral development are, we have seen, primarily shaped by the
social and cultural influences with which we are raised. Because
of that, as Republic  and Alcibiades’ own testimony make clear,
private education—even good education—is almost always futile
when societal influences pull against it. In order to reliably produce
virtuous citizens, therefore, proper education must include not
only instruction at the individual level, but also the elimination of
harmful influences at the public level. For Plato, this means that
citizens must be more or less univocal in affirming true standards
of virtue: moral education will be consistently effective, in other
words, either on a large scale or not at all. Accordingly, the Re-
public’s political and educational policies are carefully designed to
make sure that what the citizens and culture of the Kallipolis as
a whole treat with honour is truly admirable and what they treat
with dishonour truly shameful. This is evident, for example, in
Socrates’ censorship of the traditional poets, whom he criticizes for
praising the wrong sorts of character and for making disgraceful
behaviour appear respectable. Instead he allows only ‘hymns to
the gods and encomia of good men’ (  –). By regulating
the content of poetry, Socrates turns one of the main venues for
corruption in Athenian culture into a tool for instilling correct
values. Likewise, Socrates’ Kallipolis leaves no room for the as-
semblies or law courts, where the democratic many exercise their
problematic influence on the young. Finally, we find that Socrates
places great emphasis on the need to distribute honours to those
who truly deserve them in the city—namely, the virtuous and wise.
The Guardians, he says, will be happier than Olympic victors, ‘for
 The Assembly, of course, is replaced by philosophical rulers. On eliminating
the law courts (certainly, at least, as Athenians know them), see  – and  –.
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the Guardians’ victory is even greater’ ( ). In various ways,
then, Socrates aims to make sure that the values of the citizens—
especially concerning what is admirable and honourable—are not
only correct, but also uniform. In the Kallipolis a young person’s
spirited desire to be admired and honoured, therefore, will find
satisfaction only through the pursuit of a lifestyle that is genuinely,
rather than merely apparently, virtuous. If book  diagnoses the
shortcomings of the traditional education outlined by Protagoras,
then the programme of moral education outlined in books , ,
and  is designed to correct those shortcomings in the ideal setting
of the Kallipolis.
.. The development of Plato’s thought
The line of interpretation I have defended offers a partial account
of the philosophical motivations for two of the most distinctive the-
oretical advancements of the Republic: its accounts of psychology
and education. On a general level, my conclusion is in line with the
findings of many previous commentators: I have argued that both
the theory of tripartition and theRepublic’s educational programme
reflect Plato’s acceptance of an important role for non-rational mo-
tivations in our psychology—motivations, that is, that can arise in-
dependently of our considered judgements about what is best for
us—as well as his pessimism about the possibility of any success-
ful education that ignores or improperly attends to such motiva-
tions.My interpretation deepens our understanding of this familiar
picture, however, in several ways. To begin with, the attention of
previous commentators has tended to focus on the importance of
appetitive desires in Plato’s thinking. There are notable exceptions
to this rule, particularly in more recent literature, but historically,
discussion of the motivation for tripartite theory has centred on
Plato’s recognition of non-rational appetites and the various ways
in which they can lead us to live or act badly. My account, while
 See further discussion of this point in Hobbs,Hero, –.
 D. Scott, ‘Platonic Pessimism andMoral Education’,Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy,  (), –, provides an especially good analysis along these lines.
He emphasizes ways in which appetitive desires can corrupt or prevent correct rea-
soning about how to live our lives and what is valuable; I take my proposals to be
compatible with much of what he says. Often discussion of the role of the appe-
tites in motivating tripartite theory has been framed in terms of the issue of akrasia.
Many commentators have proposed that Republic ’s account of the soul is designed
largely, or even primarily, in order to accommodate the possibility of akrasia (in con-
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compatible with such readings, emphasizes instead the crucial role
of spiritedmotivations in Plato’s thought. One reason this matters is
that whereas Plato’s treatment of appetitive desire tends to highlight
the psychic danger posed by the appetites, and hence the impor-
tance of minimizing their influence in our psychology, Plato’s dis-
cussion of spirited desire highlights spirit’s potential to serve a posi-
tive role in moral development as the ‘ally of reason’. Importantly,
then, Plato’s psychological theory is motivated not only by appre-
hension about the appetites, but also by a cautious optimism about
spirited motivation: given proper upbringing, the spirited part of
the soul can provide support for mastering the very appetites that
are the source of deep ethical concern for Plato.
The interpretation I have offered also adds to previous accounts
by emphasizing the close relationship between spirited desire and
the many, a connection that has received little attention even in the
handful of accounts that do focus on the role of spirit in motivating
tripartite theory. If my interpretation is right, however, then con-
siderations about the many are integral to Plato’s thinking about
education. He takes the many to exert a powerful, often irresistible,
influence on the spirited element of a young person’s psychology,
and his critical attitude towards democracy is at least partly groun-
ded in that very fact: because the democratic crowd is appetitive in
its orientation, neglect of the many on the political level will have a
grave and nearly inevitable impact on the moral development of in-
dividuals. Beyond the borders of the ideal city, each young person’s
soul is in danger of succumbing not only to the ruinous influence
of appetites within his own soul, but also to the compelling sway
of appetitive souls from without. Even those souls that do possess
the fortitude to escape the threat of the former, therefore, still face
a formidable obstacle to virtue in the latter.
trast, it is presumed, either to an earlier Platonic or to a Socratic ‘intellectualist’ ac-
count of the soul that denies such a possibility). See, for example, Bobonich,Utopia,
–; T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, ), –, and Plato’s Moral Theory
(Oxford, ), –; T. Penner, ‘Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul andWeak-
ness of Will’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl.  (), – at –; and
C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Indianapolis,
), –. For some replies to this line of interpretation see esp. G. R. Carone,
‘Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?’, Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy,  (), –; G. R. F. Ferrari, ‘The Three-Part Soul’, in id. (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, ), – at –
; Kahn, Socratic, –; and J. Wilburn, ‘Akrasia and the Rule of Appetite in
Plato’s Protagoras and Republic’, Journal of Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
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This brings me to my final point, and to what I take to be the
primary contribution of my interpretation: it reveals an important
but perhaps overlooked motivation for some of the most distinc-
tive new views we find in the Republic. In particular, Plato’s re-
flections on the problem of Alcibiades, according to my account,
provide at least a partial motivation both for the tripartite theory
of the soul and for the programme of moral education associated
with it. On Plato’s view, promising individuals such as Alcibiades
can—largely by way of their spirited ambitions—either be ruined
by improper education or led towards true virtue by a proper one.
The Kallipolis is designed to be a place, not only where someone
like Socrates would have been duly appreciated, but also where an
exceptional and ambitious person like Alcibiades would never have
been corrupted in the first place.
Wayne State University
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adam, J., The Republic of Plato, vol. ii (Cambridge, ).
Anderson, M., ‘Socrates as Hoplite’, Ancient Philosophy,  (),
–.
Barney, R., Brennan, T., and Brittain, C. (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self
[Divided Self] (Cambridge, ).
Bluck, R. S., Plato’sMeno [Meno] (Cambridge, ).
Bobonich, C., Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics [Utopia]
(Oxford, ).
Brennan, T., ‘The Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Object’,
in Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided Self , –.
Brickhouse, T. C., and Smith, N. D., Plato’s Socrates [Socrates] (Oxford,
).
Brickhouse, T. C., and Smith, N. D., The Trial and Execution of Socrates:
Sources and Controversies (Oxford, ).
Bury, R. G., The Symposium of Plato [Symposium] (Cambridge, ).
Bussanich, J., and Smith, N. D. (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to
Socrates [Companion] (London, ).
Cairns, D., Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in An-
cient Greek Literature [Aidōs] (Oxford, ).
Carone, G. R., ‘Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Carone, G. R., ‘Calculating Machines or Leaky Jars? The Moral Psycho-
logy of Plato’sGorgias’,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (),
–.
 Joshua Wilburn
Chroust, A.-H., Socrates, Man and Myth: The Two Socratic Apologies of
Xenophon (Notre Dame, ).
Coby, P., Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on
Plato’s Protagoras [Protagoras] (London, ).
Cooper, J. M. (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis, ).
Cooper, J. M., ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’, in id., Reason and
Emotion, –.
Cooper, J. M., Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology
and Ethical Theory (Princeton, ).
Cooper, J. M., ‘Socrates and Plato in Plato’s Gorgias’, in id., Reason and
Emotion, –.
Corrigan, K., and Glazov-Corrigan, E., Plato’s Dialectic at Play:
Argument, Structure, and Myth in the Symposium [Dialectic] (Uni-
versity Park, Penn., ).
Danzig, G., ‘Alcibiades versus Pericles: Apologetic Strategies in Xeno-
phon’sMemorabilia’, Greece and Rome,  (), –.
Dodds, E. R., Plato:Gorgias [Gorgias] (Oxford, ).
Dorion, L., ‘The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem’, in D. R.Morrison
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Socrates (Cambridge, ), –.
Dover, K. J., Aristophanes: Clouds (Oxford, ).
Ferrari, G. R. F., ‘The Three-Part Soul’, in id. (ed.), The Cambridge Com-
panion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, ), –.
Friedländer, P., Platon, ii. Die Platonischen Schriften (Berlin, ).
Futter, D. B., ‘Shame as a Tool for Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias’, Journal
of the History of Philosophy,  (), –.
Giannantoni, G., Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, vol. i (Naples, ).
Gill, C., ‘Plato and the Education of Character’, Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie,  (), –.
Gosling, J. C. B., Plato (London, ).
Gribble, D., Alcibiades and Athens [Alcibiades] (Oxford, ).
Hobbs, A.,Plato and theHero: Courage,Manliness and the Impersonal Good
[Hero] (Cambridge, ).
Hooper, A., ‘The Dual-Role Philosophers: An Exploration of a Failed Re-
lationship’, in Johnson and Tarrant (eds.), Alcibiades, –.
Irwin, T., Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, ).
Irwin, T., Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford, ).
Johnson, M., and Tarrant, H. (eds.), Alcibiades and the Socratic Lover-
Educator [Alcibiades] (London, ).
Kahn, C., Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a
Literary Form [Socratic] (Cambridge, ).
Kamtekar, R., ‘Imperfect Virtue’, Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Kerferd, G. B., ‘Protagoras’ Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the
Protagoras of Plato’, Journal of Hellenic Studies,  (), –.
The Problem of Alcibiades 
Kustas, G. L., and Moser, S., ‘A Comment on the “Relativism” of the
Protagoras’, Phoenix,  (), –.
Lear, G. R., ‘Plato on Learning to Love Beauty’ [‘Beauty’], in G. Santos
(ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic (Malden, Mass., ),
–.
Lorenz, H.,The BruteWithin: Appetitive Desire in Plato andAristotle (Ox-
ford, ).
McCoy, M. B., ‘Protagoras on Human Nature, Wisdom, and the Good:
TheGreat Speech and theHedonism of Plato’sProtagoras’,Ancient Phi-
losophy,  (), –.
Moline, J., ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’, Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie,  (), –.
Moss, J., ‘Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul’ [‘Shame’], Oxford Stu-
dies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Moss, J., ‘The Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in
Plato’s Gorgias’, Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Nehamas, A., ‘Beauty of Body, Nobility of Soul: The Pursuit of Love in
Plato’s Symposium’, in D. Scott (ed.),Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philo-
sophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat (Oxford, ), –.
Nehamas, A., ‘Only in the Contemplation of Beauty is Human Life Worth
Living: Plato, Symposium  ’, European Journal of Philosophy, 
(), –.
Nehamas, A., ‘Socratic Intellectualism’, in id., Virtues of Authenticity
(Princeton, ), –.
Nussbaum, M., ‘Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wis-
dom’ [‘Aristophanes’], Yale Classical Studies,  (), –.
Nussbaum, M., The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, ).
Penner, T., ‘Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of Will’,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl.  (), –.
Penner, T., ‘The Historical Socrates and Plato’s Early Dialogues: Some
Philosophical Questions’, in J. Annas and C. J. Rowe (eds.), New
Perspectives on Plato:Modern and Ancient (Washington, ), –.
Penner, T., ‘Thought and Desire in Plato’, in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A
Collection of Critical Essays (New York, ), –.
Price, A. W., ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?’, Ancient
Philosophy,  (), –.
Ralkowski, M., ‘The Politics of Impiety: Why was Socrates Prosecuted by
the Athenian Democracy?’, in Bussanich and Smith (eds.), Companion,
–.
Ramsey, R., ‘Plato’s Oblique Response to Issues of Socrates’ Influence
on Alcibiades: An Examination of the Protagoras and the Gorgias’ [‘Re-
sponse’], in Johnson and Tarrant (eds.), Alcibiades, –.
 Joshua Wilburn
Reeve, C. D. C., ‘A Study in Violets: Alcibiades in the Symposium’ [‘Vio-
lets’], in J. H. Lesher, D. Nails, and F. C. C. Sheffield (eds.), Plato’s
Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception (Washington, ),
–.
Reeve, C. D. C., Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (In-
dianapolis, ).
Reid, J., ‘Unfamiliar Voices: Harmonizing the Non-Socratic Speeches and
Plato’s Psychology’, in P. Destrée and Z. Giannopoulou (eds.), Plato’s
Symposium: A Critical Guide (Cambridge, forthcoming).
Scott, D., ‘Platonic Pessimism and Moral Education’, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Sesonske, A., ‘Hedonism in the Protagoras’, Journal of the History of Phi-
losophy,  (), –.
Sharpe, M., ‘Revaluing Megalopsuchia: Reflections on the Alcibiades II’,
in Johnson and Tarrant (eds.), Alcibiades, –.
Sheffield, F., Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire [Desire] (Oxford,
).
Shields, C., ‘Simple Souls’, in E.Wagner (ed.),Essays on Plato’s Psychology
(Lanham, Md., ), –.
Singpurwalla, R., ‘Why Spirit is the Natural Ally of Reason: Spirit, Rea-
son, and the Fine in Plato’s Republic’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philo-
sophy,  (), –.
Smith, N., ‘Did Plato Write theAlcibiades I?’,Apeiron,  (), –.
Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and his Works (London, ).
Taylor, C. C. W., Plato: Protagoras [Protagoras] (Oxford, ).
Vlastos, G., ‘Introduction’, in id. (ed.), Plato: Protagoras (New York,
), vii–lvi.
Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY, ).
Vlastos, G., Socratic Studies [Socratic] (Cambridge, ).
Waterfield, R., ‘The Quest for the Historical Socrates’ [‘Quest’], in Bus-
sanich and Smith (eds.), Companion, –.
Waterfield, R.,Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (Toronto, ).
Wilberding, J., ‘Plato’s Two Forms of Second-Best Morality’, Philosophi-
cal Review,  (), –.
Wilburn, J., ‘Akrasia and the Rule of Appetite in Plato’s Protagoras and
Republic’, Journal of Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Wohl, V., ‘The Eros of Alcibiades’, Classical Antiquity,  (), –.
Wolz, H. G., ‘Hedonism in the Protagoras’, Journal of the History of Phi-
losophy,  (), –.
Woodruff, P., ‘Socrates and the Irrational’, in N. D. Smith and P. Wood-
ruff (eds.), Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy (Oxford, ),
–.
